



# Employing Boston's Urban Youth in Summer Jobs

*Civic Technology &  
Data Collaborative: Boston*

# Boston Collaborative



DIVISION OF  
YOUTH  
ENGAGEMENT &  
EMPLOYMENT



**CODE** *for*  
**BOSTON**  
A CFA BRIGADE



# Today

1. Why summer jobs?
2. Participatory design: Youth-led algorithm
3. Measuring outcomes and Boston's unique ecosystem
4. Early Findings and Next steps



# First introductions to the Workforce, ever






# Summer employment positively impacts long-term outcomes for low income youth

- High school graduation and attendance rates
- Increased reading and math scores in the short term
- Decrease in violent-crime arrests
- Reduction in risky and violent behaviors, including the use of drugs and alcohol, physical fighting, damaging property, and threatening someone with a weapon

# Jobs for Youth in the City of Boston



DIVISION  
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**Each year, the DYEE receives 8,000+ applications but is only able to place ~3k youth in summer jobs**

# Executive support for this work

**Mayor Marty Walsh's has a stated target to hire 10,000 young people across Boston**



# Equity and the Jobs Lottery: 60:40 rule





**The time it takes to reach and place  
a single young person: 14 minutes**



# Challenges to Running the Program

- **Processing time (capacity)**
- **Manual selection (little data, few inputs)**
- **Need for more meaningful positions**

**EMBEDDING  
EQUITY and YOUTH INSIGHT  
DIRECTLY INTO THE TECH**




# Designing a placement algorithm by young people, to be used by young people






# Redistributing jobs, equitably



How accessible are jobs in our neighborhoods?




# Rebalancing for transit access and applicant interest





# MEASURING OUTCOMES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: WHY + HOW

# Batching the Lottery Groups



**split test (summer 2016)**

# Building on existing MIT research on school assignment models

What Really Matters in Designing School Choice Mechanisms\*

Parag A. Pathak, MIT and NBER<sup>†</sup>

Draft date: January 2016

## Abstract


In the last decade, numerous student assignment systems have been redesigned using ideas from economists in the large American cities and elsewhere. This article reviews some of these case studies and uses practical experiences to take stock on what has really mattered in school choice mechanism design so far. While some algorithm design details are important, many are less practically important than initially thought. What really matters are basic issues that market operators in other contexts would likely be concerned about: straightforward incentives,



**DR. PARAG PATHAK**



# Leveraging research institutions and Boston's unique civic technology ecosystem



**research universities**



**public sector civic tech**



**private civic tech community**

# Resiliency and turnover

- **We've had 100% turnover on this project in one year**
- **Unique relationship between client (DYEE) and technical advisor (DoIT) has made all the difference**

# Early Findings

**19% of the automated batch  
accepted a job offer, through email,  
saving 8.8 weeks (44 full work days)  
of manual phone calls**



## Next Steps?

1. Post-lottery survey and results evaluation
2. Exploring other sides of the issue (end-to-end user experience; front-end interface; lottery portal)
3. Mapping and building our civic tech ecosystem

Q+A